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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
In The Matter of Habeas Corpus for 
Howard Wayne, Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae, 
and Karen Taylor. 
Minors 
By LaPriel Taylor, 
Petitioner and Appellant 
vs. 
George Q. Waddoups and Marie Waddoups, 
his wife, 
Defendt:tnts and Respondents 
and 
In The Matter of the Adoption of Howard 
Wayne Taylor. Linda Kay Taylor, Sheryl 
Rae Taylor and Karen Taylor, 
Minors 
By George Q. Waddoups and Marie Wad-
doups, his wife, 
Defendants and Respon.dtents 
vs. 
LaPriel Taylor, 
Contestant and Appellant 
Case No. 7720 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In the case before the court the Petition for Adop-
tion of Howard Wayne Taylor, Linda Kay Taylor, Sheryl 
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Rae Taylor and Karon Taylor was filed by the defend-
ants on the 8th day of December 1950. On the 6th day of 
January 1951 an Order of Adoption was entered by the 
court adopting the children to the defendants. A pur-
ported Con-sent of Adoption, which had been signed be-
fore a notary public, was filed by the defendants, and 
the Order of Adoption issued by the court was based 
. upon said consent. 
No notice of th~ hearing was given to either parents 
of said children. On the 26th day of February 1951 the 
plaintiff filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and 
an Order of Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by the 
court. The petition was filed by LaPriel Taylor, the 
mother of said children, and was filed for the purpose of 
obtaining the custody of the children. The plaintiff also 
filed on the 28th day of February 1951 a !lotion to 
Vacate the Order of Adoption entered as aforesaid. The 
motion was based upon an affidavit and a Notice of Mo-
tion was filed on the same date, together with an Answer 
to the Petition of Adoption. 
The defendants filed their Answer to the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and the matter was set for hearing on the 
12th day of :March 1951 but was continued upon motion 
of the defendants to the 26th day of March 1951. On 
the 26th day of March 1951 the defendants filed a 
brief in support of the Order of Adoption and requested 
a continuance until the 8th day of April 1951. On the 
26th day of :March the plaintiff was given time to file 
a reply brief. On the 5th day of April1951 the plaintiff 
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filed her brief. On the 8th day of April 1951 the court 
continued the Inat.ter until the 22nd day of April and gave 
the defendants the right to file a reply brief, which was 
done on or about the 20th day of April 1951. On the 
22nd day of ~-lpril 1951 the court granted plaintiff's Mo-
tion to Vacate the Order of Adoption and the hearing 
on the "\Vrit of Habeas Corpus together with the hearing 
on the Petition for Adoption was set for the 14th day of 
May 1951 at the hour of 2 o'clock p.m. Since the facts 
in both cases were the same, the two cases were heard 
jointly. The hearing was had and the court on the 28th 
day of 1Iay 1951 entered its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law and Judgn1ent on the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus. The court awarded the writ in part and awarded 
Howard Wayne Taylor to the mother, LaPriel Taylor, 
and denied the writ in part and awarded the custody of 
Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae and Karen to the defendants 
George Q. and ~farie "\Vaddoups. On the 18th day of June 
1951 the court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment and entered an Order of Adop-
tion and granted the Petition of Adoption in part and 
denied it in part. The court denied the Petition of Adop-
tion for Howard Wayne Taylor but granted the Petition 
for Adoption of Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae and Karen Tay-
lor to the defendants, and from these judgments the 
plaintiff appeals. LaPriel Taylor, the mother of the 
children in this case will be called the plaintiff and George · 
Q. "\V addoups and Marie "\V addoups, his wife, the adopt-
ing parents, will be called the defendants. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, LaPriel Taylor, and her former hus-
band, Howard Wayne Taylor, were the parents of four 
children- Howard Wayne, Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae and 
Karen Taylor. She was married to Howard Taylor in 
1940 and obtained a divorce in Cache County in 1944. She 
re-married him in 1946 and obtained a second divorce 
from Howard Wayne Taylor on the 13th day of December 
1950 in the Third Judicial District. Throughout their 
marriage the husband of the plaintiff was very unstable 
and irresponsible and wilfully failed to support his 
family. He was sentenced to the State penitentiary upon 
a charge of burglary and received a dishonorable dis-
charge from the Army Air Corps. He deserted his 
family intermittently throughout their marriage. He de-
serted them once in 1948, once in 1949, and deserted his 
wife in April 1950. 
When Mr. Taylor failed to support his family,- the 
plaintiff was forced to go to her parents' home and ob-
tain assistance from the Welfare until she could obtain 
einployment with which to support herself and minor chil-
dren. From September 1948 until December 1950 the 
plaintiff was suffering from ill health and was unable 
to work to support herself and minor children. On June 
1, 1949 she placed three of her children with the defend-
ants who were plaintiff's second cousins. The Cache 
County Department of Public Welfare supported them 
in the defendants' hmne from June 1, 1949 to about Janu-
ary 15, 1950. On June 1st the mother placed the children 
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with the defendants so that she could go to California, 
where her husband was then working for the Southern 
Pacific Railroad, in an effort to effect a reconciliation 
and to persuade hin1 to· support her and the 1ninor chil-
dren. 
He lost his job and they returned to Cache County 
around the 1st day of October 1949 and plaintiff and her 
husband lived with plaintiff's parents in Nibley, Cache 
County, Utah, until the 15th day of January 1950. The 
husband lived \dth the plaintiff until November 28, 1949, 
when he deserted the plaintiff and his children. Prior 
to the tin1e he (ieserted the1n on the 28th of November 
1949 he sold his automobile for the sum of $450 and 
promised to give the plaintiff $250 to enable her to obtain 
an operation needed to restore her to normal health. 
Instead of giving the money to the plaintiff he took the 
money and deserted her as above stated. 
On or about the 15th day of January 1950 the plain-
tiff moved to Ogden and took her four minor children 
with her. She rented an apartlnent and due to her iln-
paired health, and because of the tender years of the 
children, and also due to the fact that the father would 
not support them, she obtained assistance from the Weber 
County Departlnent of Public Welfare. 
Neither the Weber County Department of Public 
Welfare nor the Cache County Department of Public 
Welfare were able to give the plaintiff the needed medi-
cal attention to restore her to health. Her physical con-
dition grew worse and throughout this entire time the 
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plaintiff had fainting spells and fainted once and twice 
a day due to anen1ia caused from hemorrhages. 
During the last two weeks in February 1950 the 
plaintiff's parents were forced to take two of the ~hil­
dren and care for them as the plaintiff was unable to 
do so on account of her ill health. On or about the 1st 
day of March 1950 the defendants went to the plaintiff's 
home and plaintiff told the defendants that due to her 
health and because of the acts of her husband she was 
going to be forced to place her children for adoption 
and if the defendant would bring a consent of adoption 
on the 9th of March 1950 her husband .. would be there 
and they would sign said consent. On the 9th day of 
March 1950 the defendants came to the plaintiff's home 
with a purported consent of adoption which the plaintiff 
and her husband signed before a notary public in Ogden, 
Utah. The plaintiff and her husband signed the Consent 
of Adoption and surrendered the children to the defend-
ants. 
That on the 9th day of March 1950 prior to the tinie 
that the plaintiff signed the purported Consent of Adop-
tion, the defendants told the plaintiff that if her healh 
improved and she got to the point where she could care 
for the children that they would return the children to 
her. That on the 8th day of March 1950 the defendants 
told the plaintiff!s parents that they would return the 
children to the plaintiff if her health improved and she 
was able to care for them. This information was given 
to the plaintiff by her parents prior to the signing of the 
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purposed Consent of Adoption, and the defendants now 
refuse to fulfil the agreement entered into by and be-
tween the plaintiff and defendant on the said 9th day of 
March 1950. 
The plaintiff then went to Salt Lake City with her 
husband who had promised to provide her with the neces-
sary medical attention to correct the condition which was 
then causing her ill health. During the month of April 
the plaintiff's husband was arrested in Ogden, Utah, upon 
a misdemeanor and was sentenced to the Ogden City 
jail. He escaped fron1 the jail and deserted the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff at that tilne was pregnant and due to her 
ill health and pregnancy she was forced to again apply 
for assistance from Salt Lake County. 
From the 9th day of 1\tiarch 1950 to November 1950 
she visited the children on several occasions and took 
presents and articles of clothing to them. She also kept 
in touch with the defendants by mail. The defendants 
are the second cousins of the plaintiff and the plaintiff 
was well acquainted with the home conditions in the de-
fendants' home prior to the time she gave the childr~n 
to the defendants. 
On the 28th day of November 1950 a fifth child was 
born to the plaintiff and her husband and on that date the 
doctors at the Salt Lake County hospital performed an 
operation upon the plaintiff-the operation necessary to 
correct plaintiff's ill health. 
On the 8th day of Deceinber 1950 the plaintiff in-
formed the defendants that her health had in1proved and 
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that she wished the children returned to her, but the de-
fendants refused to do so. During the Christmas holidays 
in December 1950 the plaintiff again requested the de-
fendants to return the children to her and they again re-
fused to surrender the children. 
The Cache County Department of Public Welfare 
knew of plaintiff's desire to regain the custody of the 
children but they and the defendants failed to inform the 
court of this fact on the 6th day of January 1951 when 
the first Order of Adoption was granted. 
That at the time of the hearing on the 14th day of 
May 1951 the plaintiff was then engaged to be married 
to one Kernoff Christensen, who was of the age of 41 
years and is a welder by trade and capable of earning 
a regular weekly income of $80 per week. 
That since the hearing and on or about the 20th day 
of June 1951 the contemplated marriage was consum-
mated. Kern off Christensen testified in court that he had 
been with the children on different occasions and that if 
the children were given to the plaintiff, upon their mar-
riage, he would assume the responsibility of supporting 
and maintaining them and that he would see they were 
not placed upon welfare. On the 28th day of ~{ay 1951 the 
court granted the Writ of Habeas Corpus in part and 
awarded the custody of Howard Wayne r:raylor, age 10 
years, to the plaintiff, and denied the hearing in part 
and awarded Linda Kay, Sheryl Rae and Karen to the 
defendants. On the 18th day of June 1950 the court 
granted the Petition for Adoption in part and granted 
10 
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au Order of Adoption to the defendants of Linda Kay, 
Sheryl Rae and l(aren and denied the Petition of Adop-
tion for IIoward 'Yayne Taylor. From these judgments 
the plaintiff now appeals. 
ARGUMENTS 
1. That the court erred in finding that the Consent 
of Adoption was in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 14-4-8, Utah Code Annotated of 1943. 
2. The court further erred in finding that the Con-
sent of Adoption as signed by the plaintiff was irrevoc-
able. 
3. The court erred in Inaking any finding in the 
adoption proceedings that the plaintiff had abandoned 
her children for the reason that there were no allegations 
in the petition that the children had been abandoned by 
the plaintiff, nor did the petition pray that the children 
be found to be deserted and abandoned children. 
4. That the court erred in finding that it was for the 
best welfare and interest of said children that they be 
adopted by the defendants. 
5. That the court erred in entering its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment in both the 
adoption proceedings and the writ of habeas corpus, as 
they were contrary to and not supported by the evidence. 
11 
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The provisions of Chapter 4, Title 14, so far as are 
relevant to this case, are as follows: Section 14-4-4, 
Section 14-4-8, Utah Code Annotated 1943. 
14-4-4. Consent to Adoption. 
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without the 
consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegitimate child 
without the consent of its mother, if living, except that 
consent is not necessary from a father or mother who 
has been judicially deprived of the custody of the child 
on account of cruelty, neglect or desertion; provided, 
that the district court may <?Tder the adoption of any 
child, without notice to or consent in court of the parent 
or parents thereof, whenever it shall appear that the 
parent or parents whose consent would otherwise be 
required have theretofore, in writing, acknowledged be-
fore any officer authorized to take acknowledgements, 
released his or her or their control or custody of such 
child to any agency licensed to receive children for 
placmnent or adoption under Chapter 3 of this Title, and 
such agency consents, in writing, to such adoption." 
14-4-8. Procedure-Agreement of Adopting Parents. 
The person adopting a child and the child adopted, 
and the other persons whose consent is necessary, must 
appear before the district court of the county where the 
person adopting resides, and the necessary consent must 
thereupon be signed and an agremnent be executed by the 
person adopting to the effect that the child shall be 
12 
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adopted and treated in all respects as his own lawful 
child. 
It seen1s clear that the alleged consent in the case 
at bar was not n1ade in confonuity with the statutes, as 
it was not signed before the court nor was it signed in the 
county where the adopting parents reside. 
That the petitioners and the children to be adopted 
and all persons whose consent is necessary must appear 
before the District Court in the county where the adopt-
ing parents reside and the necessary consent must there-
upon be signed. 
The consent in the case at bar was not signed before 
the court as required by this section of the Statute but 
was signed before a notary public in Ogden, a fact which 
was found by the trial court. 
In the 1933 Utah Code Annotated, 14-4-8, the statute 
provides as follows: 
Procedure - Contract of Adopting Parents: 
The person adopting a child and the child adopted, 
and the other persons whose consent is necessary, must 
appear before the district court of the county where the 
person adopting resides, and the necessary consent must 
thereupon be signed and an agreeinent be executed by the 
person adopting to the effect that the child shall be 
'8.dopted and treated in all respects as his own lawful 
child; provided, that if the persons whose consent is 
necessary are not within the county, then their written 
13 
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consent, duly acknowledged in the manner provided for 
the acknowledgement of deeds, shall be filed at the time 
of the application for adoption. 
This has been the law in Utah for a number of years 
but the Legislature in 1941 deemed it advisable to change 
the provisions of Sections 14-4-8 in the 1933 Code to cor-
rect certain abuses that then existed. 
If the consent of adoption in the case now before 
the court is held to comply with the provisions of our 
Statute, then no change would have been made by the 
amendment made in 1941, as this holding would in effect 
continue the practice that existed prior to the amend-
ment in 1941. 
The Section 14-4-8 was made by the Legislature to 
protect both adopting parents and parents surrendering 
children for adoption. 
By requiring persons to appear before the court 
when they signed a Consent of Adoption to their minor 
children, the court can then protect parents from fraud, 
misrepresentation, force or undue influence in obtaining 
consents of adoption. The court being an impartiai body 
could see that parents are informed and that they fully 
understand the effect of the act which they are perform-
ing. In the case at ba.r if this consent had been signed be-
fore the court and, as in this case, the parents were told· 
they could have the children back upon certain contin-
gencies, the court would have taken the proper steps to 
14 
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protect the 1nother's rights to the children. Oftentimes 
consents of adoption are granted while under great emo-
tional strain and, as in this case, at times they are signed 
while suffering from discouragement and despair, and 
to pern1it a consent to be signed before a notary public 
and to allow prospective foster parents to take advantage 
of these conditions and to "railroad" persons into sign-
ing consents before the consequence of their acts have 
been duly considered. Since the adoption statute is 
purely statutory and since the matter involved is so ex-
tremely in1portant, that of placing the lives of your chil-
dren in the hands of another should be strictly construed. 
Sufficiency of Consent 
There was no adoption of com1non law. This aspect 
of jurisprudence was known to the Civil Law of Rome, 
to the ancient Assyrians and to the early Germans. 
Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 Ill. 115. 
But what provisions we have on the subject is purely 
statutory, and in derogation of common law. 
Hook v. Wright, 329 Ill. 299; 
Keal v. Rhydderick, 317 Ill. 231 ; 
Rabbitt v. Weber & Co., 297 Ill. 491, 31 So. 
( 2) 163 211 La. 910. 
In Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 Ill. 115, the Court said 
(P. 121): 
Where a Court in exercising a special statu-
tory jurisdiction the record must show upon its 
15 
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face that the partiular proceeding is one upon 
which the court has authority to act. .T urisdiction 
in such cases is never presutned ... (Rice v. 
Travis, 216 Ill. 249) ... Although adoption stat-
utes are construed liberally . . . there must be 
substantial compliance with the provision of the 
statute conferring jurisdiction or the proceedings 
will be void. 
In Watts v. Dull, 104 Ill. 86, one of the questions 
presented was the effect of the failure of the petitioner's 
husband to join in the petition for adoption. The Su-
preule Court held that the petition was insufficient to 
confer jurisdiction and that the adoption decree wa.S 
a nullity. 
In discussing the Watts case, the Court in the Ash-
lock decision said, P. 123: 
In the recent case of ::McConnell v. McConnell, 
(345 Ill. 70) where it was announced that the rule 
of strict compliance was no longer adhered to, we 
expressly referred to the decision on the Watts 
case as correct for the reason that there had not 
been substantial compliance with the statute. 
The Supreme Court in People v. Cole, 322 Ill. 95 
(in reversing 320 Ill. Appr. 413 said: 
"The adoption proceedings being statutory, 
the validity of a decree of adoption depends upon 
the compliance with every essential requirement 
of the statute authorizing it." 
For the same ruling, see : 
In re Bohn, 306 Ill. 214; 
People v. Fahey, 230 Ill. App. 143. 
1() 
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One A1nerican Jurisprudence P. 37. 
"The rule in the great majority of the jurisdictions 
wherein the question has arisen, is that a natural parent's 
consent to the proposed adoption of a child, duly given 
in compliance with a statute requiring such consent as a 
prerequisite to such adoption, 1nay be effectively with-
drawn or revoked by the natural parent before the adop-
tion has been finally approved and decreed by the court, 
and a natural parent's withdrawal of consent to an adop-
tion, even after the order confinning the adoption has 
been made, but prior to the expiration of the time for 
filing a petition for a rehearing, may sometimes prove 
effective. 
And while it has been indicated that the natural par-
ent's right to withdraw consent to adoption is entirely 
a matter of personal choice, but not dependent upon any 
stated reason, it has also been indicated that interven-
ing vested rights on the part of the adopting parents or 
the child might exclude the natural parents from with-
drawing consent and thus barring the adoption." 
In 2 C. J. S. Adoption, Par. 21 ( 4) the genera;! rule as 
the effect of the withdrawal of consent to adoption by the 
natural parent is stated as follows: 
Consent may be Withdrawn Before Adoption. 
"Consent 1nay be withdrawn at any time before adop-
tion, even though given in writing, and accompanied by 
transfer of the custody of the child, and even though the 
17 
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natural parent had abandoned the child, and an adoption 
based upon a consent that has been withdrawn is void." 
Washington 
In State Ex Rel Town v. Superior Court, 165 Pac. 
(2nd) 862. "Certiorari issued to review the order of the 
Juvenile Court of Kitsop County adjudicating a four 
year old child to be dependent. It was the illegitimate 
child of one Irene who was admittedly unfit for its 
custody. On November 10,1944 said Irene (mother) gave 
her written consent to the adoption of her child and on 
January 26, 1945, while said adoption proceedings were 
pending, she appeared in court and revoked her consent. 
The court aHowed her revocation and returned to her the 
child. The statutes of Washington are almost identical 
with those of lllinois." 
Other cases in this jurisdiction holding that a con-
~ent may be withdrawn are: 
Nelms v. Birkland, 279 P. 748, 153 Wash. 243; 
In Re Roderick, 291 P. 225, 158 Wash. 377. 
In the Nelms case the court quoted with approval 
1 C. P. 1378: 
"A natural parent, by entering into a contract 
for the adoption of his child by another, waives his 
rights to the custody and control of the child, but 
subject to his liability to be sued for his breach 
of his contract, he may revoke his gift and resume 
custody of his child at any time before a legal 
adoption has been made. 
18 
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Oregon 
In re: Adoption of Capparelli, 175 P. (2nd) 1933, 
the Oregon Suprmne Court said as follows in holding 
that a consent may be revoked: 
It is the general rule that the natural parent 
who has consented to the adoption of a child in 
compliance with a statute which 1nakes such con-
sent a prerequisite to adoption 1nay effectively 
withdraw or revoke his consent at any time be-
fore the court has made a decree of adoption. 
(cases cited). 
\Y est Virginia 
In Harold Y. Craig, 59 W. Va., the court held that 
the consent relates to the time of the entry of decree, 
citing with approval :Marion v. Fehy, 11 W. V a. 402: 
The entry of a consent decree is a statement 
on the record, not theretofore the parties agreed 
to enter such a decree, but that they now (when 
the decree is entered) consent to its entry, and if 
they do not when it is so entered, it cannot be 
entered. 
The court went on to speak with approval of the 
above conclusions : 
The rule announced by this court in that case 
seems to us to be sustained by sound reasoning 
... parties may agree out of court as they choose, 
but the entry of a consent decree requires consent 
to its entry by the parties, and if one of the par-
ties who will be 1naterially affected thereby with-
draws his consent and objects to its entry at the 
time it is offered, it cannot be entered. 
19 
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:h1:ichigan 
In Re White's Adoption, 300 :Mich. 378, 1 N.W. (2d) 
579 (1940) the naturalnwther of the n1inor child had duly 
consented to its adoption in conformity with statutory 
requirements as to consent, and a decree of adoption was 
thereupon duly entered. Subsequently, before the expira-
tion of the statutory period during \Yhich decrees might 
be modified or set aside, the natural mother filed a writ-
ten withdrawal of her consent and petitioned that the 
decree of adoption be vacated. In affirming an order 
vacating the decree of adoption the court said: 
The issue thus narrows itself down to the 
question whether the last part of the order of the 
probate court hereinbefore quoted at length, made 
upon the rehearing vacating and setting aside the 
previous order confirming adoption, was a proper 
order. This court is asked to reverse the findings 
of the probate court, and of the circuit court upon 
appeal, and to hold that this part of the order 
should be set aside. At the Yery out~et, we are 
confronted with the fact that the natural parent 
did withdraw her consent to the adoption during 
the ninety da~-s' period while the n1atter of con-
firming the adoption was still within the authority 
and control of the probate court if a petition for 
rehearing be filed. After a rehearing had been 
granted and before any further order might he 
made by the probate court, that court was then 
confronted with the established fact that it no 
longer had the necessary consent of one of the 
natural parents. It has been withdrawn. 
Appellants contend that ~larcena 'Vhitr, the 
natural mother, could not withdraw her consent 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at the ti1ne it was atteu1pted without showing 
fraud and dure~~ in the procurement thereof. 
\Yhile this question has not been squarely before 
us, it has been raised in various proceedings in 
other jurisdictions. In .Minnesota it has been held 
that the n1other's consent n1av be revoked at anv 
ti1ne before the child is legaliy adopted, State e~ 
rel Platzer v. Beardsley, 149 Minn. 435_1~3 N.W. 
956. In \Yashington, it is held that adoption is a 
contract between the parties but that a natural 
parent 1nay revoke his consent at any time before 
a legal adoption has been made, subject to his lia-
bility to be sued for breach of contract; and that 
when the written consent is once revoked, the 
necessary consent being absent, such an order can-
not be 1nade. In re Nelms, 153 Wash. 242, 279 P. 
746. See, also, Fitz v. Carpenter, Tex. Civ. App., 
1:2-± S.\Y. (2d) 420. In the case at bar, the probate 
judge stated no reason for setting aside the ori-
ginal order, and the record before us contains 
none of the testimony taken either in the probate 
court or the circuit court on the appeal. Without 
a record disclosing what reasons impeUed the 
mother to withdraw her consent, we have no occa-
sion to pass upon the question whether such rea-
sons were sufficient, if indeed any stated reason 
is necessary beyond the mere fact she had changed 
her mind. It is our opinion that under the circum-
stances of this case, no vested rights having inter-
vened, the natural mother had the right to with-
draw her consent to the adoption during the 
ninety days while the probate court still had con-
trol over the 1natter of rehearing." 
In the annotation to the foregoing case (130 ALR 
1030) the 1najority and 1ninority rules as to withdrawal 
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of consent by the natural parent is thus stated (1038-
39): 
Ohio 
The rule in a majority of the jurisdictions 
wherein the question has arisen is that a natural 
parent's consent to the proposed adoption of a 
child, duly given in cmnpliance ''4/ith a statute re-
quiring such consent as a prerequisite to an adop-
tion may be effectively withdrawn or revoked by 
the natural parent before the adoption has been 
finally approved and decreed by the court, RE 
WHITE ( Mich) (reported herewith) 1034 : RE 
NELMS ( 1929) 153 Wash. 242, 279 P. 7 40. And 
see State ex rei. Platzer v. Beardsley (1921) 149 
Minn. 435, 183 N.W. 956; Re Anderson (1933) 189 
Minn. 85, 248 N.,V. 657; Fitts v. Carpenter (1939); 
Tex. Civ. App. 124 S.W. (2d) 420. 
In French v. Catholic League, 60 Ohio App. 442, 
144 N.E. (2nd) 113, the mother of an infant gave her 
consent to an adoption of her child and gave the child 
to the Welfare League. In allowing her to withdraw 
her consent before decree, the court used the following 
language: 
Why should such an unfortunate mother not 
be permitted to revoke her prior consent for re-
linquishment when she has not been advised of its 
acceptance and it has not yet been acted upon? 
. . . She 1night have been destitute and shortly 
thereafter acquired an inheritance and an ability 
to care for her offspring. :Must she adopt her own 
child¥ Surely, she being a suitable person, it 
would have been a cruel thing for a society de-
voted to the welfare of children to say you can-
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not reclai1u your given word and have back your 
child. 
For sinrilar decision see In Re Rubin's Adoption, 60 
Ohio Supp. 26 Minnesota. 
In Platzer Y. Beardsley, 149 :Minn. 435, the court 
said: 
An illegitin1ate child cannot be adopted with-
out the consent of the mother. Her consent, 
though given in writing and accompanied by a 
transfer of the custody of the child, may be re-
voked at any time before the child is legally 
adopted. 
For another case holding that consent may be re-
voked, see In Re Anderson, 189 Minn. 85; 240 N.W. 657, 
where the court said : 
Such a consent, once given, may be with-
drawn at any time before adoption. 
:Mississippi 
In Wright v. Fitzgibbons, reported in 21 So. (2nd) 
709 (April 1945) the facts showed that the mother of an 
infant child gave her consent to its adoption and peti-
tioner, Mrs. Fitzgibbons, filed her petition to adopt the 
child based on said consent of the mother. ·The mother 
then appeared, objected and withdrew her consent before 
a decree was entered. The court, in aUowing a with-
drawal said : 
This appellant having appeared and objected 
to the adoption of her child; her consent thereto 
theretofore given for its adoption, becan1e in-
effectual. 
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The court found that the mother had abandoned the 
child and the proceedings for decree of adoption were 
filed in 1945 after a consent had been given in 1938 and 
the 1nother evidenced little or no interest in the child 
during the seven years. 
Pennsylvania 
Piper v. Edbert, 28A (2) 460. 
January 16, 1941 a 1nother in a hospital signed a 
contract to give custody of her baby to Edbergs for one 
year and that they may adopt child any time within that 
period. In December 1941, nwther asked for her baby 
and this was refused. Adoption petition was filed by the 
Edbergs and December 26th mother 'vas granted writ of 
Habeas Corpus. 
In ordering the child be retained to the mother the 
court said: 
It is a serious matter, and often times unfor-
tunate to deprive a natural mother of her child. 
It is against puhlic policy to destroy or limit the 
relation of parent and child. 
Louisiana 
Green v. Paul, 31 So. (2) 212 La. 337. 
In March 1945, the Green petitioner for the adop-
tion of Patricia Paul, alledging that they have had cus-
tody for 14 n1onths and that the father, Charles Paul, 
gave his written consent. After a report of the vVelfare 
Department, the court entered an interlocutory decree of 
adoption on :May 28, 1945, and awarded custody of child 
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to the petitioners. On February 28, 1946, the father 
moved for revocation of the Decree. 
The Court held that the 1notion of the father con-
stituted a withdrawal of the consent, says: 
In Yiew of the fact that the Inotion filed by 
Paul operates as a withdrawal of hjs consent to 
the adoption of his child, we n1ust initiaHy decide 
if his opposition does not effectively destroy the 
adoption proceedings as a Inatter of law, even 
though it be assmned that the withdrawal is 
founded on whiin or caprice. 1. (The court con-
tinues to quote with approYal1 CJS P. 21, P. 306). 
Consent Inay be withdrawn at any time before 
adoption, even though given in writing and ac-
conlpanied by the transfer of the custody of the 
child ... The application of the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel in an adoption proceeding does not 
appeal to us ... Adoption is a creature of the law 
... Consequently, disallowance of the right to 
"ithdraw consent on the basis of estoppel would 
be tantanwunt to an approval of the adoption 
where the consent is actually lacking ... a result 
contrary to the intention of the law. 
California 
Re l\fcDonnell's Adoption, 176 P. (2) 778. 
The Court stated the California rules as follows: (P. 
782) 
'Ve think it Inust be concluded from the adop-
tion statutes of this state that the natural parents 
have the right to withdraw a consent to adoption 
at any time before the rendition of the decree of 
adoption. 
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It is apparent that the court erred in finding that. 
the Consent of Adoption was irrevocable as such finding 
is contrary to the law as stated by our own Supreme 
Court and by the courts throughout the United States. 
In the case of Harrison vs. Iiarker, 44 Utah 541, 142 
Pac. 716, the court held that the best welfare and interest 
of the child was the primary consideration of the court. 
In that case an illegitimate child was given to the de-
fendants by the mother and she informed them that 
she was surrendering the child to them for adoption. 
Several months later the mother of the child intermar-
ried with the plaintiff who was the father of said child. 
Several months later he commenced an action to regain 
the custody of the child and the court held that it was 
the best welfare and interest of the child that should 
be considered in determining the custody under these 
circumstances; that the presumption was that the best 
welfare and interest of the child is with the natural par-
ents. 
3. In the case of Hardcastle vs. Hardcastle, 221 
Pac. (2d) 887, our own Utah Supreme Court, the court 
restated the law as laid down by Harrison vs. Harker. 
In the case of Hardcastle vs. Hardcastle the mother of a 
15 year old girl left her child with the grandmother. 
Evidence showed that on two occasions she attempted 
to take the child from the custody of the grandmother 
but was prevented from doing so. The mother then 
went to Portland where she worked and had an income 
of approximately $80 per week as well as an allotment 
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frmn her husband in the sun1 of $80 per n1onth. During 
that time and for the next seven years she sent no monev 
whatsoever for the support of the child and only visited 
the child once. In 1944 she ca1ne to Salt Lake to obtain 
a divorce front her husband but did nothing to regain 
the custody of the child, and the court in awarding the 
divorce decree awarded the custody of the child to the 
grandlnother. The plaintiff then remarried and 23 
months after the decree of divorce was granted she 
returned and asked for the custody of the child. The 
court in deciding this case held it was the best welfare 
and interest of the child that should guide the court in 
awarding her custody and that this presumption was 
so strong that the neglect of seven years was not strong 
enough to overcome. 
In the case of Baldwin vs. Nielson, 170 Pac. 179, a 
child was born to the plaintiff and his "rife. The plaintiff 
was then in the military service. He returned home and 
upon returning home lived at the home of the defendant 
and while there he indulged rather heavily in the use 
of intoxicating liquors. The plaintiff and his wife then 
went to California and while in California the plaintiff 
drank heavily and was intoxicated continually. The wife 
obtained a divorce and the custody of the child was 
awarded to her. The child from its birth resided with 
the grandnwther and with the defendant and maternal 
uncle. Approximately 2 years after the divorce the 
mother of the child died and the plaintiff requested that 
the custody of the child be awarded to him. Evidence 
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showed that since his discharge frmn the Army he had 
not worked; that he had married within a month after 
the divorce was granted and that at the time of the hear-
ing in the above entitled action he did not at that time 
have employment but merely had the promise of employ-
ment. The court held in this case that there was a pre-
sumption that the best welfare and interest of the child 
was with the natural parent and the neglect by the 
father was not sufficient to overcome this presumption. 
During this time also the father had contributed nothing 
whatever toward the support of the child. 
The petition for adoption in the case now before 
the court is based entirely upon the Consent of Adoption 
signed by the defendant and her husband. There were 
no allegations in the petition that the plaintiff had 
deserted and abandoned her children nor was there a 
request in the prayer that the children be found by the 
court to be deserted and abandoned children. Regard-
less of this fact the court n1ade a finding in the adoption 
proceedings that the children had been deserted and 
abandoned by the plaintiff but since they had not been 
abandoned by the plaintiff they were eligible for adop-
tion by the defendants. 
This finding see1ns very unique, particularly because 
the court granted the petition in part and denied it in 
part. If the plaintiff had abandoned Linda Kay, Sheryl 
Rae and Karen, then certainly she had abandoned How-
ard Wayne also, as the facts concerning all of the chil-
dren were identical. Since there were no allegations in 
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the petition for adoption that the child had been aban-
doned, the court would be restricted in its findings to 
the allegations of that petition. The petition could have 
been modified upon proper nwtion but no motion was 
ever n1ade asking that the petition be modified. No 
objection was raised to the introduction of testimony 
because the testin1ony was being introduced in support 
of the defendant's answer to the 'Vrit of Habeas Corpus, 
and even though the court was justified in finding that 
the children had been abandoned by the mother the court 
was n1aking such findings contrary to the law as set 
forth by our own Suprmne Court. 
In the case of Jensen vs. Earley, 228 Pac. 217, an 
illegitimate child was placed with the defendant with 
the understanding that they were to be permitted to 
adopt said child. The mother filed a Writ of Habeas 
Corpus to regain the custody of the child and the de-
fendant pleaded that the mother had abandoned said 
child. The court in that case made the following state-
ment: 
"Abandonment in such cases ordinarily means 
that the parent has placed the child on some door-
step or left it in some convenient place in the 
hope that someone will find it and take charge 
of it, or has abandoned it entirely to fate or 
change. To make arrangetnents beforehand with 
some proper and competent person to have the 
care and custody of the child is not abandonment 
of it, as that term is ordinarily understood." 
In the case at bar, the children were placed with 
the defendants who, according to their own statements, 
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are competent and proper persons. Throughout the time 
the children were with the adopting parents the plaintiff 
visited the children and took thmn presents and also 
contacted the d_efendants by mail. Certainly these chil-
dren are not abandoned to fate or change nor were they 
left on a door-step or anywhere else with the hope that 
someone would find them and care for them. 
In the case of Lucas et al. vs. Strausser, VTF Pac. 
In the case of Lucas and others vs. Strausser, 196 
Pac. (2nd) 862, the father had placed his motherless 
children with his mother in January of 1944. In October 
1944 the father visited the children who were then with 
the plaintiff and stated he had come to make some ar-
rangement to care for the children and that he was then 
going to Alaska. The father went to Alaska where he 
earned from $110 to $135 per week. From October 1944 
until April 194 7 he paid nothing whatever for the sup-
port of the children; he made no effort to contact the 
children or his mother; in 1946 he returned to Butte, 
Montana, but did not contact the children, who were in 
Wyoming, until April 1947. He found that the children 
were adopted and that the court had held that the chil-
dren had been abandoned by him. The Wyoming court 
held in that case in order to show an abandonment the 
evidence must be clear that the parent did not reserve 
the right to re-claim the chiidren and there must be 
conduct on the part of the parents which evinces a 
settled purpose to forego all parental duty and relin-
quish all parental clai1ns to the children. The court then 
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eited lr innans 't:s. Luppie, 47 N.J. and Equity, 302-20A-
969. In the case at bar there was no evidence whatever 
to show that the nwther relinquished all claims to the 
children as there was an understanding between the 
plaintiff a.nd defendant in the case now before the court 
prior to the signing of the purported Consent of Adop-
tion that if the plaintiff in this case ever regained her 
health the children would be returned to her. 
The mother visited the children and at all tin1es 
manifested an interest in the1n, and nine months from 
fhe date they were placed with the petitioners she asked 
for their return. This was almost immediately after the 
operation which had corrected the condition of her ill 
health and which 'vas the cause of these children being 
placed in the home of the defendants. When the children 
were placed with the defendants plaintiff had been suffer-
ing very ill health for a number of years and had been 
endeavoring to obtain n1edical care needed to restore 
her health, and had been endeavoring for ten years to 
get her husband to assume his responsibility toward 
the children, but had failed in both. She informed the 
defendants that because of her health and because of 
her husband's conduct she was being forced to give her 
children up. The court in Jensen vs. Earley, supra, 
stated "That in addition to all that has been said, a gift 
or an abandonment may not be lightly inferred from 
either acts or language induced by grief, discouragernent 
or 1nental distress." Certainly the facts in the case at bar 
shows that these children were given as a result of both 
discouragmnent and mental distress. 
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4. That the court erred in making any finding that 
it was for the best welfare and interest of said children 
that they be with the defendants. That the defendant 
George Q. Waddoups is of the age of 54 years. (Tran-
script of Testimony, Page 117, Lines 5 and 6). While 
the defendant Marie W addoups is of the age of 37 years 
(Trans. of Testimony, Page 149, Lines 20 and 21). While 
the natural mother is of the age of 30 years and her 
present husband is of the age of 41 years, and has a 
weekly income of $80 per week (Trans. of Testimony, 
Page 85, Lines 13 and 14; Page 131, Lines 20 to 21; 
Page 84, Lines 2 to 9; Page 84, Lines 10 to 30; Page 17, 
Lines 21 and 22). 
That the plaintiff's husband has good habits and 
appears to be a reliable person (Trans. of Testimony, 
Page 17, Lines 5 and 20). That the home of the defend-
ants is but four rooms and the children are three girls 
and are forced to occupy the same bedroom as the de-
fendants, while the home of the plaintiff has three bed-
roorns and the girls would have a bedro01n separate and 
apart from the parents. Besides these physical facts 
there is the fact that the plaintiff is the natural mother 
of the children and the law is weH settled in this juris-
diction that there is a presun1ption that the childrens' 
best interests are with the natural mother unless she 
is 1norally unfit to have the children. This point was 
discussed in the case of State vs. Sorensen, a Utah case, 
and in the case of Hummel vs. Parish, a Utah case, 134 
Pac. 898. In that case, however, the child was awarded 
to the foster parents but the child had been away from 
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the natural 1nother fr01u 1904 to 1911, during which 
time the nwther 1nanifested no interest whatsoever in 
the child and on one occasion in the testin1ony made a 
statement that she wished the girl for selfish purposes. 
However, the facts of this case are vastly different than 
the one at bar. These chitdren have only been away from 
the natural n1other for the period of nine n1onths when 
she again asked that they be returned to her. They were 
also taken with the understanding that the children 
would be returned to her if her health improved. This 
point was also discussed in the case of Jones vs. Moore, 
a Utah case, 213 Pac. 191. There the contest was between 
the father and the 1naternal grandparents. The court 
made the state1nent. as follows: 
"Without now pausing to go into the question 
of what may be involved within the term best 
interest and welfare of the child, it must suffice 
to say that that tenn, as it is understood, applied 
in cases like the one at bar, has reference more 
particularly to the moral welfare than to mere 
comfort or advantage that wea!lth can give; if 
such were not the case poor parents could not 
sustain their rights to the custody of children 
where a rich man has taken a special interest and 
where between hilnself and the children there 
exists a strong liking or affection. Unless a parent 
by his acts has forfeited the rights to the custody 
of his minor children the presumption his rights 
to have the custody are all in favor of the parent." 
In this case evidence shows that the mother surren-
dered the children due to discouragement and despair 
brought on by ill health and by an irresponsible and 
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a neer-do-well husband. This point was also discussed 
in the case of Hardcastle vs. Hardcastle, 221 Pac. (2d) 
887. There a parent, a mother, left her children with 
the grandmother for a period of seven years, during 
which time she showed little interest in the child and 
gave but $20 for her support. In that case the court 
held that the best interests of the child is with the Inother, 
and there is a presumption that the best interest is with 
the natural parents; and' further stated that his pre-
sumption was so strong that the neglect of seven years 
would not overcome. In the case of Baldwin vs. Neilson, 
a Utah case, 170 Pac. ( 2d) 179, this doctrine was again 
invoked and the child was given to the natural father 
in preference to the maternal uncle. The evidence showed 
that the child had been with the maternal unde from its 
birth, which was a period of four years. There is nothing 
in the evidence in this case which shows that the mother 
is morally unfit to have the custody of the child; that 
all of the testimony shows that from the time of her 
marriage her primary concern has been to provide her 
children with the best care possible, and it was from 
worry caused by an unsettled marital life that caused 
her to surrender these children with the thought that 
they would receive the care and attention necessary to 
afford then1 the opportunities in life to make good men 
and women of them. 
5. That the court erred in entering its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment as they 
were contrary to and not supported by the evidence. 
That in the Findings of Fact the court found that the 
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Juvenile Court preferred a charge against plaintiff and 
her husband for neglecting their children. The court 
was in error in this, as there was no evidence before it 
to 1nake such a finding. The only evidence given in the 
testimony is on Page 3:2, Lines 18 to 22 ; Page 33, Lines 
16 to 20; Page 3-!, Lines 1 to 3, and Page 70, Lines 1 to 4, 
and this testi1nony was not sufficient to justify a finding 
as that n1ade by the court. 
(a) In paragraph 3 the court found that the plain-
tiff requested the defendants to take her children for 
adoption, while, in fact, the testimony shows that she 
infonned the plaintiffs that due to her health she was 
being forced to place the children for adoption. 
(b) In paragraph 5 the court 1nade a finding that 
during the su1nmer of 1950 the plaintiff confirmed her 
consent of adoption on several occasions and instead 
the only thing stated was that she expressed satisfac-
tion, stating she had done what was best for the children. 
(c) That the court erred in finding that the plain-
tiff on the 9th day of ~larch 1950 was in good health 
and able to care for said children and that she surren-
dered the children to avoid caring for them, as is shown 
by the evidence in the Transcript of Testimony, as fol~ 
lows: 
Page 41 Lines 6 to 22 
43 8 to 12 
5 25 
7 2; 4 and 7 ; 2 to 4; 29 
8 14 to 16; 8 to 30 
10 24 
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12 
13 
15 
16 
34 
35 
9 
44 
59 
47 
48 
51 
52 
77 
78 
79 
26 to 30 
16 to 18 
4 to 5 ; 10 to 13; 20 and 
21; 22 to 30 
1 to8 
5 to 13 
1,19,23 
2 to4 
27 to 30 
10 to 13 ; 22 and 23 
19 to 24 
12 to 16 
6 to 17 
2 to 7 
1 to 14; 19 and 21 
1 to 7 
21 and 23 
(d) That the court further erred in finding that the 
plaintiff had lived separate and apart from her children 
except for short intervals in the past five years, and 
that she had lived very little, if any, with said children, 
as shown by the Transcript of Testimony: 
Page 21 
22 
27 
28 
140 
Lines ~3 to 24 
1 to 9 
19 to 24 
29 and 30 
22 and 27 
(e) That the court further erred in finding that the 
plaintiff could have made a home for the children but 
that she preferred to live separate and apart from them 
to satisfy her own selfish interests, and that she had 
shown a lack of interest in her children and that she 
was restless and uninterested in said children and that 
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she had abandoned said children. That this finding is 
contrary to the testin1ony. The question of abandon-
ment has heretofore been discussed in this brief. The 
Transcript of Testin1ony touching on the other matters 
herein are as follows : 
Page 12-! 
125 
141 
142 
53 
54 
63 
64 
67 
12 
13 
15 
16 
24 
12 
28 
31 
41 
46 
48 
50 
51 
52 
69 
71 
72 
74 
75 
76 
77 
80 
Lines 23 to 30 
20 to 30 
37 
14 and 15; 19 and 20 
6 to 20 
29 and 30 
1 to 7 
4 to 30 
1 and 2 
10 to 20 
6 to 30 
16 and 18 
23 and 27 
4 and 6 
8 to 10 
16 to 24 
10 to 14 
20 and 27 
10 to 22 
3; 23 to 25 
12 to 16 
19 and 23 
6 and 17 
2 and 7 
4, 5 and 18 
26 to 30 
18 to 21 
24 to 30 
1 to 11 
5 to 11 
3 to 14 
25 and 26 
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112 
124 
125 
153 
154 
16 
177 
179 
181 
186 
4 and 7 
23 and 30 
20 to 30 
21 and 22 
14 to 22 
18 to 21 
6 to 14 
1 to 10 
16 to 20 
19 to 21 
(f) That the court further erred in finding that 
the defendants were in the prime of life as that is a con-
clusion unsupported by the evidence; and they further 
erred in finding that the children had favorably reacted 
to their care, as shown by the Transcript of Testimony: 
Page 117 
126 
46 
113 
146 
118 
119 
42 
117 
118 
126 
Lines 5 and 6 
7 to 11 
12 to 16 
15 
15 
24 to 30 
1 to4 
17 and 18 
18 to 30 
1 
1 to 6 
(g) That the court further erred in finding that 
the father had signed a consent and waiver on the 24th 
day of May 1951, as there is no testimony whatsoever 
in the Transcript of Testimony, nor does the plaintiff 
have any knowledge whatsoever of such testimony. 
(h) That the court further erred in finding that 
it was for the best welfare and interest of the children 
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that they re~uain with the defendants. The only testi-
mony touching upon this subject is as follows in the 
Transcript of Testimony: 
Page 117 
127 
149 
118 
126 
Lines 5 and 6 ; 18 and 30 
7 to 11 
20 to 21 
1 
1 to6 
That the plaintiff is much younger than the defend-
ants and she is but 30 years of age and the purported 
marriage to Kernoff Christensen has now taken place 
and was consunnna ted on the 20th of June 1951. 
Transcript of Testimony: 
Page 85 Lines 13 to 14 
131 20 and 21 
84 2 to 9; 10 to 30 
85 1 to 6 
17 21 and 22; 5 to 20 
( i) The court further erred in finding that when 
the plaintiff returned from California that she had the 
intent of abandoning said children, as there is no evi-
dence whatsoever in the Transcript of Testimony or else-
where to substantiate such a finding. 
(j) The court further erred in finding that the 
plaintiff led the defendants to believe they would be free 
to adopt said children and that she would make no- claim 
upon said children ·and that she had made none prior 
to her filing of the contest in this action. The Transcript 
of Testimony showing that this was an error is as fol-
lows: 
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Page 44 
60 
61 
78 
79 
109 
17 
18 
142 
143 
132 
133 
162 
Lines 20 to 23 
22 to 26 
1 to 11; 15 
21 thr<mgh 29 
6 to 11 
16 
23 to 30 
1 to 11; 22 and 25 
21 to 30 
1 to23 
2 to 18; 3 
1 to 6 
1 to 11 
(k) The court further erred in finding that the 
plaintiff was keeping company with one Kerno:ff Chris-
tensen prior to the divorce, as there is no evidence what-
soever on which to base such a finding. The only testi-
Inony on this subject is as follows: 
Transcript of Testimony: 
Page 16 
95 
Lines 11 to 16 
17 and 18 
(I) The court further erred in finding that the 
mother preferred not to have the care and custody of 
sa-id children, as there is no evidence upon which to base 
said finding. 
(n1) That the court erred in finding that the plain-
tiff intended to obtain relief upon which to support said 
children, as the testin1ony was that she only intended 
to obtain it until the purported marriage was consum-
mated, and that the said marriage was consummated 
on the 20th day of June 1951. 
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Transcript of Testimony: 
Page 84 
85 
98 
Lines 4 to 30 
1 to 6 
4 to 9 
That the finding that it was for the best welfare 
and interest of the children that they be with the defend-
ants has already been discussed in this brief. 
( n) That the court erred in finding that no effort 
had been n1ade to reimburse the defendants for the care 
they had given the children, as the testimony shows 
otherwise: 
Transcript of Testimony: 
Page 82 Lines 22 to 30 
83 1to6 
(o) That th~ court erred in finding that the plain-
tiff and her intended husband could not support the 
children if given to them, as such finding is contrary 
to the evidence : 
Transcript of Testimony: 
Page 84 Lines 4 to 30 
85 
86 
87 
98 
1 to 6; 13 and 14 
7 and 8 
1 and 13 
5 to 9 
(p) That the court erred in finding that it would 
be wrong after per1nitting said children to be with re-
spondents for such a long period of time to rmnove said 
children fr01n the hon1e of the defendants. The children 
have merely been with the defendants for nine months. 
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The children are young and under the age of ten years. 
The court should not only look to what temporary effect 
it wil'l have upon the children at this time but the long 
range effect, and it is the settled law of this state that 
it is for the best welfare and interest of the children 
that they be with the natural parent. ':rhis was discussed 
in the case of Hardcastle vs. Hardcastle, supra, by our 
own Supreme Court. Two of these children were with 
the plaintiff during the 1nonth of July for the period of 
two weeks and they have visited with the plaintiff 
throughout their stay at the defendants' home. Tran-
script of Testimony: 
athrough-s 
Page 59 
Page 57 
58 
84 
205 
Lines 25 and 30 
1 to 6 
4 to 30 
9 to 17 
Based upon the foregoing the plaintiff herein urges 
that the ruling of the District Court is in error and that 
the same should be reversed and the plaintiff given the 
relief sought in her Writ of I-Iabeaf? Corpus and in her 
Answer to the Petition for Adoption. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WM. G. SHELTON, 
BENJA~IIN SPENCE, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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